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LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

Robert Mundheim: The Chinese assets! We got a promise of $80
million in cash from the Chinese and then said, "The blocked property is yours to the extent that you can persuade an American court
that it is yours. "
Alan Swan: And there were suits pending against China in the
courts of the United States at that time?
Covey Oliver: Yes. One before Judge Goodman in the Northern
District of California pending since 1952! 127
Mark Feldman: Is that so? I never knew that.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SETTLEMENT

Alan Swan: We're going to pick up where we left off at the end of
last session with a discussion of the constitutionality of the agreements. There are a number of facets to this issue and it may be helpful
to lay some of them out, especially since there are some particularly
pertinent provisions in the agreements which we ought not to forget.
At one level, we must concern ourselves with the power of the President to settle private international claims. One does not, I suppose,
have much quarrel with the proposition that if the President can
negotiate a settlement which results in full payment of all claims, he
has the power to make that settlement. The problem arises where, as
part of the settlement process, he undertakes to terminate or nullify
the legal rights asserted by the private claimants and obtains, in
return, only partial payment or, in some cases, no payment whatsoever. A variant of this, of course, is the situation where, as in the case
of a substantial number of the claims against Iran, the President
undertakes to foreclose the claimants' right to seek their remedy in a
court of law and remands them to an alternative arbitral tribunal. I
hope that the arbitral process will result in full payment of all provable claims, but there is an apprehension that that may not happen. I
do not really know how one deals with that apprehension in the
context of these constitutional issues at this time. Nevertheless, it is
28
well to note article IV(3) of the Claims Settlement Agreement
which, as I understand it, provides that should a claimant receive an
award from the arbitral tribunal and should there not be sufficient
funds available to satisfy that award under the escrow account, the
127. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59
(N.D. Cal. 1952) modified, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
128. This provision provides: "Any award which the Tribunal may render against
either Government shall be enforceable against such Government in the courts of any
nation in accordance with its laws."
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claimant is free to seek recovery of the deficiency in any court willing
to enforce the award, located in any country where there is property
available to satisfy the judgment.
The second facet of our broader question concerns the relationship between the President's power to settle claims and the due process
and "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. If,
on the face of it, an exercise by the President of his power appears to
constitute a deprivation or "taking" of a property right, the question
arises whether, in light of the foreign policy context in which the
President acts, the apparent deprivation is one that violates the due
process clause or gives rise to a claim for "just compensation?"
The last facet to our question concerns the remedy. If indeed
there is a violation of due process or a "taking" that gives rise to a right
of "just compensation," does that mean that the courts can bar the
President from carrying out the settlement altogether or, in the case of
a "taking," until some provision for compensation is forthcoming? Or
does it merely mean that the private claimant now has a cause of
action against the Government for compensation? On this point, does
the Tucker Act 1 29 grant the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear these
claims, and even if it does, query: would the absence of any indication of a congressional willingness to appropriate the funds necessary
to pay the judgments withdraw the cause altogether from the judicial
power? Perhaps under the theory of Bivins,130 the claimants would
have to sue the President personally in the federal district court.
Against this background, let me do what we were about to do at
the end of the last session and turn this back to Mark Feldman who
had so deftly opened the issue to us. First, however, let me offer a
personal note. I thank you, Mark, very much for the contribution you
have made here. I only wish that the candor and the ability which you
have exhibited were common to all our public officials. We would all
be better served by our public institutions if that were the case.
[General Applause]
Mark Feldman: That is very, very nice, thank you. I suppose that
I cannot complain about being presented here as a target for everyone
else's arrows because I guess I knew that was why I was invited.
I have no dissent to register from the summary that Alan made of
the issues. The issue here certainly comes up in a context that is in

129. 28 U.S.C. § 1636(a) (1976) (vesting in the Court of Claims jurisdiction over
actions for money damages against the United States).
130. Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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many ways unique, but there is also a background to which I think
the courts are going to be very sensitive and very reluctant to ignore.
It is certainly the conventional wisdom, literally the black letter law
of the Restatement,13 ' of hornbooks like Borchard's, 1 2 and of the
Supreme Court opinions in Pink and Belmont-that the President has
the constitutional authority to settle international claims. Indeed, the
theory is that the claim is the claim of the state and not of the person,
and that such a claim can be dealt with by the Executive in the
national interest and in the interest of our foreign policy. This is
especially so where the settlement is linked with the recognition or the
normalization of relations with another state-to extend slightly the
circumstances of Belmont and Pink. There is even authority for the

proposition that the proceeds of a settlement need not be paid over to
a claimant. It is also perfectly clear after two hundred years of state
practice that the President can submit a private claim to arbitration
without the consent of the claimant, or can enter into a comprehensive agreement settling a whole class of claims by a lump sum payment without receiving either the claimant's consent or a statutory
authorization. All of this, I think, must come as a surprise, not to this
audience, but to the typical practitioner or even judge sitting in
Texas, Florida, Chicago, or one of those places where they do not get
as many foreign relations cases. When it gets up to the Supreme Court
there are going to be a few people who know these issues, and I think
it is fair to say that the Justice Department, under the Reagan Administration as well as under the Carter Administration, is very confident
that the settlement with Iran is entirely constitutional.
In our office we looked at this very hard over a long period of
time, and there are new angles to a number of issues, not the least of
which is what is the impact of the Immunities Act on the President's
historic powers? Does that Act in any way change the basic relationship of the three branches of government to this issue? I think not, but
it is certainly an issue that is going to be argued and discussed before
the courts. My guess is that the Supreme Court is going to be able to
avoid deciding the ultimate constitutional question of whether the
Executive can bargain away a national's claim because it will find
that the remedy here is fully adequate. It will not need to look beyond
the foreign affairs power of the President to provide an alternative
forum for the settlement of private claims, particularly since the
commitment in this regard is absolute: 100 cents on the dollar.
131. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32.
132. E. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION

OF CITIZENS ABROAD

(1916).
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Whatever uncertainties there are, and it is understandable that there
would be uncertainties, I do not think that the Court will find sufficient reason to raise a cloud over the President's constitutional author-

ity.
There is another aspect of the case which is very difficult for a
court to cope with, and that is the assertion by the Government that
most of the cases filed in the U.S. courts would not, in all events,
succeed in coming to an execution of judgment. There are a whole
range of reasons for this. For example, we do not know how many of
the contracts have the contacts with the United States necessary to
overcome immunity. That some courts have found to the contrary is,
in my opinion, less a careful application of current doctrine than a
reaction to the turbulent times and the emotions of the Iran crisis. In
addition, there is the question of execution of judgments. Even if the
attachments were valid, a foreign government may have immunity
from execution of judgments. In a great but unknown number of
cases, therefore, it is very doubtful that the claimants will have a
property interest significant enough to be the subject of a deprivation.
Moreover, I do not know how the courts are going to decide these
questions on any broad general basis when you have something like
300 to 400 claims. I would be delighted to hear anybody else's views
on that subject. It is a serious problem in judicial management. My
guess is that the Supreme Court will be encouraged to find sufficient
grounds for upholding the Presidential power.
Charles Brower: First of all, one should be worried about trying
to travel too far on Belmont and Pink. In Belmont, the assets sought to
be recovered were in a fund representing, in effect, an addition to the
shareholders' equity in a Russian company, all of whose creditors had
been paid off. There was only a question of who was entitled to the
remaining equity. In the Pink case, while some creditors had not been
paid off, it was strictly a question of foreign creditors. In neither case,
to my recollection, was there a domestic interest being prejudiced by
the upholding of the agreement. Much of the Court's rationale involved the need for a power in the President, in conjunction with
recognition, to marshall assets from foreigners for the benefit of domestic claimants. That is quite different from a situation in which
some domestic claimants feel that they have been prejudiced for the
benefit of other domestic claimants. In the Iranian settlement, radical
distinctions have been made in procedure, and possibly in the measure
of recovery, among various classes of claimants. So it is not nearly the
same situation.
Without prejudice to any position that I might be taking in these
cases, I do think, as a predictive matter, that the problem for the
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courts will lie, in a sense, in the issue of ripeness. How do the courts
know, how can the claimants really show right now, that they are
going to be hurt by this action? The argument against the claimants is
that, even if they may be subject to the exclusionary clause, they will
have an opportunity first to make their case before the arbitral tribunal. If they lose, under the regulations as now promulgated they will
have another chance before the courts here. And if they recover in
either forum, they will still have to try and execute the judgment or
award they receive. An arbitral award may be enforceable under the
U.N. Convention 3 3 in any number of countries of the world against
the assets of Iran, but the same is generally true with respect to
judgments. It may be years from now before anybody is sure of what
they have received. At present, it will be very difficult to prove to
anyone, which is partly a legal matter, but arguably a factual matter,
that, but for the President's action in depriving them of their attachments or their causes of action, they would have actually been able to
recover. What we are talking about is a constitutional provision protecting individuals from a deprivation of property without due process
of law. The Government can well argue that the claimants cannot
prove at this point that they have been deprived of property, even if
they could prove that they had a property interest. It is also difficult
to prove right now that any deprivation is occurring without due
process of law. I have a growing feeling that all the claimants out
there are the proverbial Seven Dwarfs looking for Snow White: every
time they think they have found Snow White, she kind of disappears.
Larry Newman halfway told us yesterday that there would be no
Snow White in New York. The emphasis, therefore, is likely to be on
preserving a position so that at such time as the claimants find that
they do not have an adequate recovery, they will be in a position to
assert their claims against the United States. Also, it is extremely
difficult for the Supreme Court to speculate on the issue of whether
any wrong will in fact occur or to say-even if it is clear that harm has
occured-that the remedy is not compensation from the United States
Government but rather judicial interference in an important diplomatic step. The latter would certainly be a momentous event.
Edward Gordon: I have one question to ask of Keith Rosenn, or
to any of you who are following the Supreme Court's work in constitutional law. Is it absolutely clear that this problem will be presented
as the deprivation of a property interest under the due process clause,

133. Convention on the Recognition

and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral

Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
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as opposed to a liberty interest? For example, the loss of a forum for
hearing one's cause of action is not, as I understand it, being treated
by the Burger Court as the same as a property interest. Can you
clarify that?
Keith Rosenn: The ripeness problem that Charlie Brower talked
about is a very real problem in this case. Much depends upon how you
present it. If you argue deprivation of property, the ripeness problem
is very apparent. I would not be at all surprised to see a court say,
"That issue is premature at this time." On the other hand, if what you
seek is a declaration that the President's action here is unconstitutional
because it deprives the claimants of all review by an article III court,
that issue may well be ripe. In other words, suppose you go into a
court and argue: "We would like a declaratory judgment that the
Executive order 34 is unconstitutional because the President is making
an exception to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Only Congress
has the power to do that, and even Congress may not completely shut
off all review by the federal or state courts." Then quite possibly you
will have framed a question with which the courts can deal right now.
It is, of course, clear under Crowell v. Benson, 135 that you do not
have to have an article III court as your original tribunal. It is not,
however, at all clear that the Congress can take away all possibility of
review by an article III court. I do not see in the procedures agreed to
by the President any possibility for the claimants of ultimate review
by the Supreme Court or any other article III court. With an arbitral
tribunal as the sole forum, presumably what the President has done is
to shut out the federal courts completely from the business of determining the validity of the claims against Iran. That kind of issue may
well be ripe.
Michael Silverman: I would like to ask whether you think it
would make a difference if Congress passed a statute to the same
effect?
Keith Rosenn: It does not make the problem go away. What it
does is pose the problem in the starkest form that we have had since
the Battaglia'36 case.

134. Exec. Order No. 12283, 48 Fed. Reg. 7,927 (1981) [for text, see infra appendix at 75].
135. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
136. Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948).
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Mark Feldman: Let me refer you in this connection to the International Claims Settlement Act,

37

which forecloses the courts abso-

lutely from any adjudication of claims settled by international agreement.
Alan Swan: Do we not have to draw a distinction here? First of
all, if you have a statute, if for example the International Claims
Settlement Act is applicable, it is a very different situation from one in
which the President relies entirely upon his own authority, because
the power to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts is vested by the
Constitution in Congress, not in the President. Secondly, I do not
believe that the International Claims Settlement Act or any other
legislation upon which the President might rely forecloses the courts
from judging whether or not the President's settlement, including a
Presidential effort to close the courts, is constitutional. All they foreclose the courts from judging are the merits of the underlying claims
against the foreign government. So, if the charge is that the Presi-

dent's settlement is unconstitutional, that there is a deprivation or a
taking of a property right, there is nothing, I think, in these statutes
which forecloses someone from going into a court to test that charge.
All that they are foreclosed from doing is litigating the issue of
whether Iran owes them some money. This is a fairly big difference
because neither the effort by Congress to close the courts under the
International Claims Settlement Act nor the President's effort to close
the courts, to the extent he has that power under IEEPA, are an effort

to say that the courts may not consider whether there has been a
deprivation of constitutional rights. If the courts are open to test the
deprivation of constitutional rights, then I would doubt that the
Congress has reached the limit of its power to control the jurisdiction
of the article III courts or to delegate that power to the President.
Stefan Riesenfeld: But the case is foreclosed by the agreements
only when Iran is the party defendant. In any case where you are
testing the constitutionality of the settlement, the President will be the

party defendant and the agreements do not even apply to the President. The agreements only bar cases against Iran; therefore, the
courts are open.
Alan Swan: That is right. As long as the cases against the President are not banned, I question whether Congress has overstepped the

boundaries of its power to control the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. That is all I am saying.
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Mark Feldman: So the agreements are constitutional; that's my
point.
Stejan Riesenfeld: To what extent?
Alan Swan: Well, to the extent that you can rest these agreements on a statute. That is why it is very important to establish a
statutory predicate for the agreements.
Mark Feldman: That is a separate issue. I would argue that this is
the President's power, not that of Congress, in the international
claims field. But there was a question raised about the judicial power:
Whether the settlement encroaches upon the judicial power by foreclosure? I am suggesting that Congress has already indicated its view
that the judicial branch may constitutionally be excluded from the
adjudication of international claims-claims against the foreign state.
I am not addressing the question whether there is a forum for resolution of a taking question, but, if what you say is correct, I think this
case will be upheld.
Charles Brower: I agree with Keith Rosenn's contention that
perhaps the better way to approach this matter at the present time is
with a separation of powers argument. The only problem is that the
worst damage has already been done over the last year by the United
States Government. There is no way for that to be remedied. The
argument that the Government makes now is that it is not affecting
the process, only the substance. The executive departments are only
reaching the substantive claim against Iran that we were trying to
assert in court; they are not telling the judicial branch how to treat a
claim which is otherwise present. What has been done over the last
year is that the United States Government repeatedly came into court
and, in effect, said: "Please stop operating because it is going to
foreclose or reduce our options." The whole struggle over the last year
was to try and push these claims to an adjudication over an amorphous resistance from the executive branch which simply said: "We
do not quite know what we are about or how to get out of this. All we
know is that it is going to be harder to do it if you change the facts on
us or put us in a corner." That is exactly what it was all about. That
was, in my view, a serious violation of the separation of powers
principle and an interference in the independent functioning of the
judiciary for which there seems to be no remedy. Now the Government is in a better situation. Now the officials have taken action and
they say: "All right, we have made up our minds, now we have done
something, and what we have done is to affect your claim and the
prerogative of the court to adjudicate it." I think that this is a difficult
argument under the present circumstances.
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Covey Oliver: I suggest that we keep clearly in mind what claims
we are talking about. My friend Mark is calling them all "international claims," and he refers to the International Claims Settlement
Act. The semantic and legislative referent for "international claims" is
in the normal usage with regard to claims that private parties cannot
pursue under international law on their own but must have espoused
for them, if at all, by the State. Since Vattel took the position long ago
that persons (natural and corporate) are not "subjects" of international law 3 8 as states (and now international organizations) 3 9 are,
the customary international law of "state responsibility" for injury to
the persons and property of aliens has controlled the concept "international claims." A cause of action that a person may bring against a
foreign state in domestic courts without the assistance of an espousing
state is not in accepted usage as such an "international claim," simply
because a foreign state is the defendant. In the typical "international
claim" situation, the private person lacks standing before any international tribunal, has no cause of action under international law, even
in a domestic court applying international law, and is barred from
suit anyway under sovereign immunity. But where a private party has
standing in a domestic court, a cause of action under the properly
applicable law, and the claim is not barred by sovereign immunity (as
often is the case under the "restrictive" theory), state espousal is not
necessary, and state-to-state principles of "state responsibility" are not
invoked.
Reference has been made in the context of this point to the Pink
and Belmont cases and to the International Claims Settlement Act
passed by Congress in 1949, initially to ratify and implement the
40
United States-Yugoslav Lump Sum Claims Settlement Agreement, 1
negotiated, incidentally, by me. I submit that in these three sources of
U.S. foreign relations law the term "international claims" was used in
the above normal context. The Act clearly refers to nationalization
claims, whether for takings in Yugoslavia or in other states with which
lump sum settlements were to be negotiated later. These are all necessarily espoused claims, put forward by the United States under the
Vattellian principle and settled "as if" claims of the United States.
Putting Belmont to one side for the sharper Pink issue, the holding is

138. M. D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1758).
139. See generally Rama-Montaldo, InternationalLegal Personality and Implied
Power of International Organizations, [1970] BarT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123.
140. Agreement Relating to the Settlement of Pecuniary Claims Against Yugoslavia, July 19, 1948, United States-Yugoslavia, 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S. No. 1803.
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that United States foreign policy as to the espousal of nationalization
claims against the U.S.S.R. overrides the administrative law and
policy of the State of New York with regard to the marshalling and
winding up by the State Superintendant of Banks of various creditor
claims against the New York branches of nationalized Russian banks.
Considering that since the days of Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams the United States has not espoused creditor claims, Pink is, in
effect, a "super-espousal" case for American property nationalized in
the U.S.S.R. Probably, also, Pink took away no vested, private rights
to sue, it simply stopped Superintendant Pink from going ahead. Pink
is thus flimsy authority for the point that an executive agreement by
the President alone may take away an existing cause of action of a
plaintiff with standing in a domestic court and not barred by immu4
nity. If Pink did go farther, it seems overruled by Reid v. Covert 1
and other cases involving due process and separation of powers.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: The problem you have with historical
practice or precedent here is the great shift in the concept of sovereign
immunity. We are now in an age where states do business: "Princes
stoop to trade." This means that, to the extent that these claims
against a foreign state such as Iran are on the basis of a commercial
contract, there is little question under international law that the state
instrumentality is no longer immune. It is a very different situation
from the kind of international claims for the expropriation of property
that the executive power was dealing with in terms of the International Claims Settlement Act.
Covey Oliver: We are not arguing; we are just trying to get the
discussion focused. And I do not parade a horrible-I am not being
argumentative-when I say that if you regard as an "international
claim" any claim that involves a foreign government defendant
which, if sued upon, would adversely affect a foreign policy interest
of the United States, then you have given to the Executive the power
to wipe us out all of the time. Suppose someone wanted to sue and
could sue PEMEX142 in Texas, but for one reason or another the
Department of State fears it would ruffle the Government of Mexico
too much; so, does the judge throw it out of court? It is a very dubious
power-one the courts will probably not stand for.
Ved Nanda: Are there any plans for having Congress participate
in some sort of consultative capacity on this issue?

141. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
142. PEMEX, the state-owned Mexican petroleum company.
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Mark Feldman: We have had lengthy, extensive consultations
and committee hearings, some with the majority in executive session,
some public. I think it's just about done. Two committees in the
Senate and in the House, both the Foreign Affairs and the Banking
Committees, have had hearings or meetings of one kind or another. As
far as I know they are just about wrapped up.
The point that Covey Oliver raises is a serious one and should be
addressed. I do not know of any contract-talking about the nonbanking sector-where there is a waiver of sovereign immunity in the
contract. Certainly I am not aware of any. Most of the contracts that I
am aware of have an arbitration clause, usually with some reference
to Iranian law, although there are some with references to the ICCI4 3
and other things like that. I am not sure about the past practice of the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Surely you are right that in
the great majority of cases it was property or tort.
Covey Oliver: Actions giving rise to "state responsibility."
Mark Feldman: Yes, but I do not think tort, as a general rule, is a
question of state responsibility under international law. There are
exceptions to that, but I do not think the distinction was drawn on the
basis of what was a claim of state responsibility under international
law and what was just a claim of liability of a foreign state. I think
also that there have been some contract claims. Certainly our agreements have, on occasion, included contractual claims. There is a
doctrine, a bit ambiguous in scope, which says that a tortious breach
of contract is a matter of international responsibility. We have certainly taken a broad view of that in recent years in our office, particularly if some anti-U.S. motivation gave rise to the claim or if there was
a property interest, such as in a natural resource or a concession
agreement or that sort of thing. The question is, assuming you are
right about the premise, whether the federal courts are going to
decide that they, rather than the President, should determine which
of the claims are international claims in a situation where there is a
cataclysmic disruption of relations between two countries.
Covey Oliver: Yes, I think the courts will decide this issue. Constitutionally, the issue is a judicial question unless properly withdrawn
from the judiciary in accordance with the Constitution. I do not think
it can be withdrawn by executive action alone. The most that could

143. Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration,
reprintedin 1 C. SCHMITTHOFF, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Doe. IV.
A.3 (1979 & Supp. Dee. 1980).
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be done is by legislative participation with the Executive to restrict the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The basic point I am trying to
get at here is that, when a claimant appears in court with a claim
against a foreign state that is potentially suable, the Executive cannot
prejudge the issue.
Take a simple diversity case involving a choice of law provision
in a contract. It is for a court to say whether that choice of law
provision does or does not violate the public policy of the forum and,
therefore, whether that provision should be applied or not. It is a part
of the choice of law process itself. Under the settlement with Iran, the
Executive purports to make that decision. I do not recall that the
executive department in the past has been the source of authority on
what to do about stipulations in contracts as to what law governs a
case. In Bremen v Zapata,144 the Court made the decision whether a
choice of forum clause in the agreement was valid or not in terms of
public policy, either federal public policy (in admiralty cases) or the
best federal guess as to the applicable state public policy (in diversity
cases).
Robert Mundheim: Take a particular claim: A contractor built
something and says, "I now want to get paid." You respond, "That's a
nice commercial claim that ought to be decided in the courts." The
question is: "Why isn't he getting paid?" That "why" doesn't arise out
of a commercial transaction. It arises out of the difficulty between
two nations. To resolve that problem the President makes the settlement.
Covey Oliver: It could go that way in your case, as creditor
claims are not "espoused" under U.S. practice.
Oscar Schachter: I want to note that I am not sure whether these
comments apply to the case of the clearly excluded claimants who are
denied access to the arbitral tribunal because of the Iranian courts
clause. There I presume that Bremen v. Zapata would apply. It is
conceivable that the courts would hold that the choice of forum clause
was unreasonable and unjust. Certainly that is an arguable point. I
also agree with Mark on one point he made. I think the settlement of
foreign claims that we negotiated in the past were not confined to
international responsibility in the strict sense. I think there were other
cases, although the general thrust of your argument, Covey, would
still be relevant. My point, though, was about the denial of access to

144. Bremen Towing Co. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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any forum except the Iranian forum, and whether in those cases the
question of public policy and due process would be a ripe question at
this stage.
Mark Feldman: That question does not really arise because our
regulations provide that those cases may be continued in the U.S.
courts, although there is some tension with Iran over this point.
Oscar Schachter: You mean all of the excluded claimants may
still have their remedy in the American courts?
CharlesBrower: It is for a court to decide whether the choice of
forum clause is to be upheld. The United States Government is not
precluding the possibility of those clauses being adjudged unenforceable.
Alan Swan: But I understand that in the case of the so-called
"paragraph 11 claims"145 -the hostage claims and all that-your regulations call for dismissal. It is just cases excluded by reason of an
Iranian choice of forum clause that will have the benefit of suspension
rather than dismissal.
Hans Smit: May I ask a question on that? What if the court says,
"I am not suspending the case because the Agreements say you can't
come here. I am dismissing the case."
Mark Feldman: I would guess a court would not do that. It
would have no incentive to do that. The Agreements are not self-executing. It has been interpreted by the executive branch in a manner
congenial to the property interests of U.S. citizens.
Hans Smit: But if the Agreements did that, would it be constitutional?
Mark Feldman: If the court says it is constitutional, I guess it's
constitutional.
Keith Rosenn: I have one question and then an argument to
make, depending upon how the question comes out. First the question: The Agreements say that the United States will bar and preclude
the prosecution in the courts of the United States of any pending or
future claims against Iran. Does that apply to claims like the EDS
case146 where a final judgment has already been entered?
Mark Feldman: That paragraph does not apply to the EDS case
at all. It applies only to hostage claims.

145. Algerian Declaration, supra note 1, at para. 11.
146. 508 F.Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex 1981).
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Keith Rosenn: Will the agreement, nevertheless, cut off a claim
that has already reached final judgment in any of the courts? There is
only one. What happens to that one?
Mark Feldman: Let me just say that Bob Mundhiem's opinion
was, and everybody's opinion still is, that the judgment was not
licensed. That is a nice issue.
Keith Rosenn: The EDS case could very well pose a kind of
United States v. Klein147 issue if the attempt is made to deprive the
court of jurisdiction. That is the kind of case where a judgment has
already been entered in favor of the claimant. If you attempt to take
away jurisdiction of the court at that point, a court is likely to say that
is an attempt, in effect, to prescribe the rule of decision for the court
and the Constitution prevents you from doing that. I just don't know.
Alan Swan: It is not a rule of decision in the process of adjudicating the claim. It is a withdrawal from the court of the ability to
execute against assets. I would think Congress has the power to do
that.
Keith Rosenn: Then you are back into the point Cynthia Lichtenstein 48 was making yesterday. Does that become the taking of property without due process? That also shifts the nature of the argument
from the article III problem, the Ex Parte McCardle 4 situation, to
the problem of the "taking" clause.
Stefan Riesenjeld: I would like to speak to that very problem. But
I would like you to travel a little route with me. I start out with
something Cynthia Lichtenstein said. It perturbs me very much. She
referred to the change in the doctrine of immunity. 50 What has
changed is that the rule of international law barring one state from
adjudicating acts of other states in its domestic courts no longer applies to commercial acts. Many courts have said so, foreign courts
particularly. What has changed is that there is no longer a rule of
international law, if there ever was one, restraining a nation state
from adjudicating commercial claims against another state in its own
courts. It does not say that it has to be so, nor does it say immunity no
longer exists. It only says that there is no longer any international law
rule mandating immunity in such cases. That, in turn, affects the
claims which our citizens have against a foreign state. As Mark Feld-

147. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
148. Supra at 90.

149. 77 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
150. Supra at 103.
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man pointed out at the start, a claim against a foreign nation is on the
level of an international claim, Whether there is a parallel claim in
our courts because our courts now may have jurisdiction over the
foreign state is another question. Basically, the claim remains a claim
against a foreign nation; that is the Vatellian analysis. It is still an
international claim, yet, under international law, we can say to a
party that we will adjudicate the claim in our courts because those
courts have jurisdiction and you [claimant] have asked for relief. This,
in turn, gives rise to two separate constitutional issues. There is the
due process issue; because we say that ordinarily you can sue in our
courts, the court has to ask whether by barring that suit a property
right has been taken away for which the United States is responsible.
But there is also article III of the Constitution which poses a totally
different question. We can find the same distinction on the domestic
level. Right now the Supreme Court of California in Agins v. City of
Tiburon' 51 has ruled that, with regard to the zoning of property, there
is a difference between the case where the property owner wants
money-that is called inverse condemnation-and the case where the
property owner is attacking the zoning statute. In this latter instance,
the court asks whether the zoning measure should ever have been
issued. In similar fashion, the article III question is quite different
from the due process problem. Under article III all you can do is
challenge the validity of the Agreements. Under the due process problem, you have the question whether a due process violation invalidates
the Agreements or only requires that the Government pay compensation.
If you follow this analysis and the point I started out with, then
under the "due process" question you must ask, "Was the claim of any
value whatsoever and has, in fact, the United States by its action
diminished that value?" Under article III, the question is not whether
anything was taken away, but whether the President invaded a constitutional power which Congress has and the President does not have. I
think that if you muddle all these concepts you do not get anywhere.
Alan Swan: I certainly agree with carefully sorting the two issues

out. The point that Charlie Brower and Keith Rosenn were making
earlier is that in terms of the ripeness issue-what questions the courts
can deal with under present circumstances-the article III issue is
probably a little easier to deal with right now than the due process
question. The latter is going to turn a lot on what happens down the

road.
151. 23 Cal.3d 603 (1979), modified, 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25 (1979).
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Cynthia Lichtenstein: Let me respond to one point. To the extent
that an enormous amount of commercial activity in today's world is
conducted by state entities, it may cause difficulties, I think, to label
any claim arising out of a commercial relationship with a state entity
as an "international claim." Covey Oliver illustrated this point nicely
with his PEMEX hypothetical. 152
Stefan Riesenfeld: That is not so difficult, if the foreign government that does business chooses its own forum by contract. That does
not create any difficulties.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: The fact is that when we are talking not
about prejudgment attachments, but about simple substantive contract claims for payment from the state entity, the foreign government
waived its immunity by treaty. That is exactly what the 1955 Treaty
said: The Government of Iran said that when our enterprises come
and do business with your people we will not plead state immunity. 153
Stefan Riesenfeld: But you have to use a term that is an AngloAmerican term and not known to half of the world; namely, the term
"waiver." Either there is immunity or there is not in such cases; you
already start muddling the waters.
Frank Mayer: I wanted to ask Mark Feldman a question. Alan
has suggested that there has to be a statutory basis for what the
Government has done here. I thought Mark had suggested, however,
that that was not true; that the executive power itself would support
it. I want to know how far you go with that as your basis?
Mark Feldman: All the way. It is historical. It is primarily the
responsibility of the President to settle international claims. It has
always been an executive power. This is recognized, for example, in a
post-Civil War statute which required the Secretary of State, when he
received funds in settlement of claims, to pour them into the Treasury. 5 4 It was a housekeeping statute to make sure that funds went

152. Supra at 103.
153. 1955 Treaty, supra note 98, at 125.
154. Act of Feb. 27, 1896, 39 Stat. 32, 31 U.S.C. 547 (1976). The text of the

provision is as follows:
Disposition of Trust Funds Received from Foreign Governments for Citi-

zens of United States.
All moneys received by the Secretary of State from foreign governments and other sources, in trust for citizens of the United States or others,
shall be deposited and covered into the Treasury.
The Secretary of State shall determine the amounts due claimants,
respectively, from each of such trust funds, and certify the same to the
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into the Treasury; they were then to be paid out of the Treasury of the
certification of the Secretary of State. It was based on the concept that
the Secretary of State received the funds as trustee. He was to determine the validity of claims and the entitlement of citizens to funds
received from foreign governments.
It seems clear to me that the President has the power to settle
international claims. In the 1930's there was a list in the Congressional
Record of about forty executive agreements on arbitration. There
have been many settlements that did not use arbitration. Yet, I think
that in this particular case there is a statutory basis in IEEPA as well.
It has been exercised by the President in that way. We rely on both
authorities. The question that seems to have crystalized here, and a
question that has to be presented to the courts, is whether all of this
history and practice and hornbook law (including the Restatements), are no longer applicable for the reasons that Cynthia Lichtenstein suggests. And I do not think that that is so. It seems to me that
when you have a cataclysmic break in relations affecting the overall
commercial relations between two states, it is fundamentally a foreign
policy problem. I believe that the indulgence which the courts gave
the executive branch throughout these months reflects an appreciation
of the fact that the problem is not manageable in the judicial branch
of government.
Harold Maier: Let me return to the question of the effect of these
Agreements. Is the executive branch taking the position that, given
that the President has the power internationally to make this kind of
agreement, he can make it self-executing without some form of participation by the legislative branch? That seems to me to be the threshold
question. If there is not any effective internal law conformable to the
terms of the Agreements, presumably the courts can go right ahead
and adjudicate the private claims, execute against the attached property if not immune, and then due process questions become inappropriate. So, is it the position of the executive branch that these Iranian
Agreements are self-executing? I realize you argue that there is a
statutory base that retroactively, in effect, serves to legitimate the
Agreements. But let us assume that argument does not hold up. Is it
your position that 150 or 200 years of history give the President the
Secretary of the Treasury, who shall, upon the presentation of the certificates of the Secretary of State, pay the amounts so found to be due.
Each of the trust funds covered into the Treasury as aforesaid is
appropriated for the payment of the ascertained beneficiaries thereof of
the certificates provided for in this section.
155. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32.

SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN

power to make agreements of this kind self-executing and, therefore,
automatically enforceable as internal law?
Mark Feldman: Absolutely; but self-executing is an elusive concept. I am not sure that these particular agreements are drafted in a
way to make them self-executing, but they may be executed by the
President, and they have been executed by the President.
Harold Maier: If they required the payments of funds to Iran
rather than the cutting off of domestic claims, would that suggest that
the funds could be withdrawn from the Treasury without going to
Congress for an appropriation?
Mark Feldman: I do not think you could ever appropriate funds
from the Treasury by Executive order.
Harold Maier: I do not either, and that suggests some limit on the
power of the President to make self-executing-or Presidentially executed-claim settlements.

Edward Gordon: Before we go further, is the executive branch
saying that the President's power to make the commitments to Iran
are based upon existing statutory authority, such as the Hostage Act 56
and IEEPA together with the President's "inherent" power? Or, is the
executive branch adding a third foundation, namely, that the 1955
Treaty itself provides some authority in the President to undertake at
least some of the commitments he made, such as the commitment to
establish an international arbitral tribunal?
Mark Feldman: I appreciate your raising the point. Frankly, I
had forgotten to mention it. It is one of the least discussed of the issues
and one of the most innovative arguments. The 1955 Treaty provides
for the settlement of disputes by reference to the World Court or by
any other means of pacific settlement. Because the Senate has given its
advice and consent to this Treaty and the Treaty applies to questions
of expropriation, breach of contract, and exchange regulations,
among other things, we feel that there is treaty authorization to
submit all such questions to arbitration. The 1955 Treaty authorizes
recourse to "some other pacific means."'15 7 If you look at the Charter
of the United Nations or at any other listing of the means of pacific
settlement, arbitration is always there. We have argued, therefore,
that the 1955 Treaty is an additional authority for these agreements.

156. 22 U.S.C. § 1731-1732 (1976) [for text, see infra Appendix at 187].
157. 1955 Treaty, supra note 98, at art. XXI (2).
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Edward Gordon: The reason I raise that question is because I

sense a danger here. Because of the interesting constitutional questions
that have been raised, we are making the same mistake that a number
of international lawyers made in anticipating the Supreme Court
decision in Sabbatino.158 They were terribly familiar with the case
law. They could discuss the decision that the Supreme Court should
have made from a very learned position. Unfortunately, it was not a
learned Supreme Court that was dealing with those issues-at least
not learned in those issues. Or, to put it another way, the Supreme
Court in 1964 was preoccupied with the parameters of its own role
and with the enormous tensions that had gone into deciding Baker v.
Carr. 159 So Sabbatino does not sound like what one might have
expected on the basis of seemingly relevant case law up to that time.
The case reflects the concerns of a group of nine men in 1964, which
included, inter alia, personal rivalries that had grown up in the Baker

v. Carr context. Now, assuming that the Supreme Court is the only
body that will ultimately decide these constitutional law questions-I
defer to whether the international arbitral tribunal might be called
upon to address those questions-isn't the most relevant factor the
current preoccupations of the Burger Court? I think the most relevant
case, if we are going to try to predict what the Burger Court would
0
do, is Goldwater v. Carter,16
which I read to be a split of something
like four to two to two to one, depending on how you want to read
those opinions. I do not think you can predict what the Burger Court
is going to do, that is why I raised the question with Keith Rosenn.

What the Burger Court has done in limiting the judicial role is to force
the plaintiff to describe precisely the interest of which it may have
been deprived and which the Court must weigh against the governmental interest in taking whatever action it took. This is apparent in
such cases as the tenure cases1 6 ' and termination of employment
cases. 6 2 I think that the Court will do the same thing in this situation. It will ask, "Are the interests of which you say you are deprived-whether they are liberty interests, property interests, or
whether it is due process in substantive terms or procedural termssufficient to outweigh the overwhelming governmental interest in the

158. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

159. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
160. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
161. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
162. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974).
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conduct of foreign relations," not as the Court said in previous cases
6
like Belmont"'
or Curtiss-Wright,6 4 but in terms of whether the
Court should get involved in this business at all." All the rest is more
theoretically interesting, but not more predictive of what this particular group of nine people is likely to do.
Soia MentschikofJ: Are you suggesting, Ed, that the desire of at
least some members of the Burger Court to get rid of litigation in the
federal courts would lead them inevitably to say this is constitutional?
This eliminates litigation in the federal courts.
Edward Gordon: It does not eliminate it, but it does affect the
amount and scope of it. And it is designed to.
Soia Mentschikoff: Well, lessens it. I just want to be sure I
understood your point.
Edward Gordon: I think it will lead them at least to look more
fondly upon certain precedents than others. For example, in the Goldwater case, 65 why did they unearth Curtiss-Wright, which, after all,
deserves a decent burial? I don't know why, but they did. And they
treated it as if it was still the leading case and nothing had happened
since it was decided. I think the underlying motivation may well be
just as you said; simply, that this is precisely the sort of case "up with
which the courts of the United States should not put." [Laughter]
Alan Swan: May I interject the point here that it seems to me
there is a coalescence of two things going on. On one hand you have
this tradition-which I suppose needs some examination-that Mark
was talking about. There is also the notion that, in spite of the
commercial aspects of the individual claims, we are really involved in
a major foreign policy conflict between two governments. Together,
this tradition and the perception of foreign policy reality become the
basis for saying that all these claims are internationalized; that they
are really government to government claims. On the other hand,
subsumed in the present jurisprudence of due process is the question
whether the property or liberty interest of which the claimant has
been deprived is so important as to outweight the governmental interest. I am not sure, but I suspect that this Court would be less inclined
to address the issue in terms of the kind of esoteric question which asks
whether or not the Iranian settlement is within the bounds of the
historic Presidential power to internationalize private claims. They

163. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 325 (1937).
164. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
165. 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979).
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would prefer, I should guess, to work with the more familiar due
process methodology-of weighing the hurt to the claimants against
the governmental interest-particularly since they can say the due
process issue is not ripe and thereby keep the decision off for a while.
Covey Oliver: I had asked for the floor to make a suggestion as to
what we should focus on, but the discussion has lead me to believe
that it might be useful, for the record at least, to deal with a few of
the points that have come up in discussion. First, an executive agreement is "inherently self-executing," as one casebook notes166 [laughter]
in an international sense (i.e., the agreement is not ad referendum but
immediate). The U.S.-Iran Agreements show us that this is not necessarily true in a domestic legal sense, for by Executive orders and
otherwise the now effective international obligation remains to be put
fully into effect nationally. The President may bind the country internationally, but he alone cannot commit Congress or bind the courts.
Internationally, the President acts as Chief of State; internally he is
not above the law and under separation of powers cannot make or
change internal law-at least internal federal law.
Secondly, as to the Vattelian principle: Perhaps I have turned the
principle around a bit, but even so, it is still a takeoff point for legal
analysis. Without regard to the immunity of the defendant state,
persons, not being states, have no standing to sue internationally; and
even if they have standing in domestic tribunals, they may not have a
cause of action. Recently, however, we have seen what may be the
beginnings of an expansion of private suits against foreign states for
offenses of the latter that are made torts under domestic law as well as
continuing to be state-to-state delicts under customary international
67
law. (Examples are Judge Kaufman's decision in Filartiga1
and
Judge Joyce Hens Green's decision in Letelier v. Republic of Chile.6 8
In the latter case the judge allowed private parties to sue a foreign
state civilly for wrongful death (assassination) under an interpretation
of the Immunities Act that, apparently resolved the standing, cause of
action, and immunities impediments in plaintiff's favor. If these national law causes of action-to some degree judge-made, if only by
determined interpretation of statutes-were to be made exclusively
referable to an international arbitral tribunal established by an exclusively Presidential agreement, is it certain that the plaintiffs would be
"out of court" within the United States? The relationship of the hypo-

166. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL
167. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
168. 488. F.Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
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thetical question to the United States-Iran arrangement is close, is it
not? In short, the problem of some types of claims having a foreign
state linkage is suability in municipal courts. The problem requires us
to differentiate sharply as to what the semantic content of the phrase
"international claims" is. An "international claim," to me, is a claim
that an individual cannot bring on his own anywhere; only a state can
espouse it for him. I would go so far as to say that it is not an
"international claim"--as distinguished from a municipal claimunless it is the type of claim that falls within the conventional, customary international law rubric for state responsibility to another
state with regard to the injuries caused by the first state to the national
or the economic interests of a citizen of the claimant state. But to
repeat the basic point, I think it is essential, in our predictive analyses
here, to identify, as Mark so far has not done, what we mean by
"international claims."
Now, leaving this aside, I suggest that before we adjourn we
ought to think about how much we can do; what constructive suggestions we can make as a group to reduce the danger of constitutional
conflict in the United States with respect to the United States-Iranian
Agreements. We all understand the difficult circumstances under

which these agreements were negotiated. Mark was very frank with
us yesterday. If diplomacy, in the trite old phrase, is the art of the
possible, the possible in this case was the best we could do under the
circumstances. We knew all along that we were going to have some
internal problems with any agreement we might be able to negotiate
with Iran. It is very interesting to talk about what the Supreme Court
will do in this or that variant of a core situation. Let us think,
however, before we adjourn as to what we can do to tone the constitutional issues down as much as possible.
I do not mention it to advocate it, but one possibility would have
been to get Congress more into the act. I suspect one reason we did
not ask Congress to act is that Congress did not want to get into the
act. So often in foreign affairs that is part of the problem. It seems to
me, referring to Goldwater v. Carter, that we may have a line there
for the mitigation of conflict; not in Justice Rehnquist's opinion
which, to my way of thinking, overdoes the political question doctrine, but in Justice Powell's concept of ripeness. Strict adherence to
the ripeness doctrine and the "suspension suggestion"1 69 that the Executive has made to the courts might be the way to reduce as much as
169. Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981), supra note
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possible constitutional conflict in this situation. And here I am still
talking only about cases involving a cause of action cognizable by the
American courts. I am not talking about the hostage claims, which
are classic "international claims." I will stipulate that section 213 of
the Restatement 170 is rightly grounded on 200 years of practice with
respect to claims that are "international claims" in the sense of those
that create state responsibility. The government can settle such
claims, no question about it, by executive agreement alone, unless all
the books be overturned. It is true that when section 213 was considered in the American Law Institute, there was a great deal of shock,
but it survived. And I think it probably will survive further review.
Charles Brower: I wanted to support the concern expressed by
Cynthia Lichtenstein, which is reflected at least inferentially in what
Covey Oliver has said, and that is a concern that anytime you enter
into the simplest commercial contract with a foreign state entity you
are putting yourself at risk, not only to the policies of the foreign state,
but also to the foreign policy of the United States. It may not rise to a
constitutional issue, but I think there is a great underlying concern
that the trend reflected in the Immunities Act and other actions of the
United States Government to leave commercial relations to the usual
commercial world, including adjudication by national tribunals, has,
in fact, been reversed in this case. There is also a concern that there
may be a broader reversal in the future as reflected partly in Judge
Duffy's decision putting control over sovereign immunity back into
the executive branch whenever a declaration of national emergency
has been made.1 71 This is reflected in many other actions taken by
the Government in the Iranian situation. I think Mark has, to some
extent, poured gasoline onto the flame of that concern with his broad
position that any claim falls within the international settlement authority of the President. Maybe it goes a little too far to extend that
power to claims not described as international claims by Covey Oliver. Perhaps the Government should simply rely on the IEEPA and
not so extensively upon an independent constitutional authority in the
President. In all events, there is a very broad concern with this matter
of policy which I believe the United States Government should work
to allay in the course of implementing these agreements and in the
subsequent actions in which we might be involved.

170.
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supra note 32.

171. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Co., 502 F.Supp. 120
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Hans Smit: You know, when I first looked at the Agreements, I
thought, "Can the President do all of this?" Now, my colleague, Lou
Henkin, assures me that in the area of foreign relations the President is
God Almighty. Apparently he is very almighty, although divine guidance seems not to have been with him on all occasions. This is a
disturbing notion to someone who is concerned about having an open
society and preserving the possiblity for an input by the body politic
on decisions that are of pervasive importance. This is especially so in
light of the fact that our Constitution does not, in express terms, give
the President that power. It is a power culled from disparate episodes
through 200 years of history. Thus, I believe we should start to think
more carefully about whether the President does have such power the
moment we can say that somehow the foreign relations of the United
States are at stake. I started thinking about some cases in which the
foreign relations of the United States were not at stake, and couldn't
think of any. That would mean that the President can rule as Caligula
or, if you want, Tiberius.
All the concerns expressed here are that there should somehow be
a limitation imposed upon the President's powers. The question is,
"How do we do this?" Two hundred years of history do not really
mean much if you look at the situation today. Whether the President
could make a deal with France in 1940, when international intercourse was wholly different from what it is today, is not really a
precedent for what the law should be today. We are all groping for
some way in which we can mark out concrete and fair guidelines by
which the power of the President, which in many cases is exercised in
secret, can be limited to those areas that we regard as properly foreign
relations. I think Covey Oliver's attempt goes in that direction, saying
international claims are claims that arise under international law.
The question, again, is: "How do we do this?" Well, one way is
to go to article III and say that the Constitution vests the judicial
power of the United States in the federal courts and not in some
arbitral tribunal. Maybe there should be an exception to that rule.
Maybe arbitration as an alternative forum is appropriate for cases
posing a narrow range of foreign relations complications, and then
only if Congress does it. And perhaps even if Congress does it, you
may want to say that ordinary claims already pending in the courts
may not be put over into an international tribunal. On this point, the
authority of the IEEPA is not self-evident to me. You can always
construe that act as not intending to bestow upon the President an
extensive power to remand all claims to an international body. In
fact, the IEEPA does not deal with claims; it deals only with rights to
assets.
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Another way is to look at the due process clause. But, as Charlie
Brower has already said, it is not so easy to shape a "ripe" substantive
due process challenge in these cases at this time. On this point, I am a
little indignant about the United States Government saying, "Well,
you know these claims were not worth much anyway, because Iran
has the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity as defenses,"
when, in these same documents, the Government turns around and
waives the defenses of the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity on behalf of the very same government that had held fifty-two
American citizens hostage for 444 days.
Lastly, there is the problem that Keith Rosenn properly raised.
In Barney v. Connecticut, 172 the Supreme Court held that there was a
right of access granted in the Constitution. The justices differed on
whether it was due process or equal protection. It seems to me that
this is a case upon which you could make the plausible argument that
here, some claimants are denied access to the American courts and are
treated quite differently from other claimants, such as the banks, who
were satisfied right away. The President did that in one fell swoop.
Does that strike you as fair conduct, as reasonable as something that
we can countenance?
A lot of this discussion tends to become very technical. What is in
these cases? What is in the practice? What have they done before? I
think we should ask ourselves whether or not this is really something
that we wish to countenence in a democratic society; whether the
President can do this on his own with the stroke of a pen, without any
input from the democratic process, and, of course, without any input
from those people who were most immediately affected. The banks
were consulted because without the banks the Government could not
do anything. But the other claimants were really not consulted. Their
claims were in fact treated by the President in the way he saw fit.
Since he did not have any money to give the Iranians, and would have
had to go to Congress to get that money, he gave the claims of the
hostages and this adjudication to an international tribunal instead.
So, if out of this whole incident comes some way of developing constitutional or statutory standards for imposing reasonable limits on the
power of the President to "go it alone" in these areas, I think we will
have made some progress. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is,
of course, a manifestation of the desire to limit the power of the
President in areas that are in the ordinary commercial sphere and not
in his typically international sphere.
172. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Tone Grant: I question whether the various constitutional issues
arising from the United States-Iranian Agreements will, as a practical
matter, be ripe for adjudication by U.S. courts. There appear to be
three general constitutional issues. First, there is the article III question concerning whether the Executive has the power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the courts. Second, there is an equal protection issue
arising out of the means of recovery provided to banks with syndicated loans, banks with nonsyndicated loans, and nonbank claimants.
Third, there is the question whether there has been a deprivation in
violation of the due process clause.
In connection with the actual hostage release, the Iranian deposits located in branches of U.S. banks outside the United States were
transferred to the escrow account in England along with Iran's deposits with the Federal Reserve Bank.1 73 President Carter issued an
Executive order effective January 20 ordering the transfer of deposits
located in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
for subsequent transfer, in part, to the security account and, in part,

directly to Iran. 174
The Office of Foreign Assets Control has issued a regulation
stating that, pending a resolution in the U.S. courts of the issues
concerning the effect of this latter order on the prejudgment attachments, there will not be any civil or criminal penalties assessed against
those banks that do not transfer the Iranian assets as ordered. 175 To
the best of my knowledge, all of these assets still remain in the U.S
banks.
The international arbitral tribunal is in the process of being
structured, syndicated bank loans have been paid off, and negotiations have begun in London concerning the claims of U.S. banks with
nonsyndicated loans to Iran. For the resolution of these claims, a $1.4
billion escrow account has been established in the Bank of England.
There is a six month period for the parties to settle their claims

directly. Since litigation pending in U.S. courts has merely been suspended, rather than terminated, by the most current Executive order171 (presumably pending action by the arbitral tribunal), and the
173. Exec. Order No. 12278, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,917 (1981) [for text, see infra Appendix at 66].
174. Exec. Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,919 (1981) [for text, see infra Appendix at 68].
175. 31 C.F.R. § 535.214 (1981); see also amendments to the Iranian Assets
Control Regulations, June 12, 1981, at 46 Fed. Reg. 31630, and June 4, 1981, at 46
Fed. Reg. 30340 [for text, see infra Appendix at 172-75].
176. Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981), supra note 89.
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attachments have not actually been dissolved, there is a question
whether the article III issue is reached. The Reagan Administration
has taken a position that it will not comment on the constitutionality
of the Agreements.
Against this background, let us consider the three constitutional
issues. First, there is a question whether U.S. banks currently holding
frozen Iranian deposits subject to prejudgment attachments should
transfer those assets to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Currently, President Reagan's Executive Order' 77 provides that litigation
is suspended in the U.S. courts.
Second, the equal protection issue may arise as a result of the
different means provided for resolution and payment of syndicated
bank loans, nonsyndicated bank loans, and claims of non-banks. The
consideration of the differences between liquidated and nonliquidated
claims should be important in the determination of this issue.
Third, with regard to whether or not there has been a taking,
there may be a problem concerning the means by which the issue
becomes ripe for adjudication. I believe that the issue of a taking may
arise only if a U.S. claimant presents his claim to the arbitral tribunal
and loses, or receives an award which is not in full satisfaction of his
claim. It' is likely, however, that the arbitral tribunal will not be
established and will not make such an award until the assets which
are currently in the U.S. banks are transferred out of the United States
into the security account. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the
U.S. banks will transfer those assets until there is a resolution in the
courts concerning the constitutionality of the Agreements and the
effect of the prejudgment attachments. Yet, if the constitutional issues
will not be ripe for adjudication until the assets are transferred and
the arbitral tribunal denies a claim or makes a partial award, there
may never be an opportunity for resolution in the U.S. courts if those
assets are not transferred and the tribunal does not become operative.
Hans Smit: With respect to those claims which under the Iranian
version of the Claims Settlement Agreement, must go to the Iranian
courts but which under the Executive Order remain suspended in the
American courts while the tribunal determines whether to hear them;
what happens to the attachments laid to provide security for those
claims?
Mark Feldman: All the attachments have been terminated.
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Hans Smit: So that since the claims remain pending, they will go
back to the American court if the international tribunal decides that it
will not hear them? In other words, they will then be in the posture in
which they were initially, but without attachments?
Mark Feldman: That is correct.
Frank Maier: May I add another wrinkle to Tone's question?
Assuming that the issue of the voidness of the attachment does get up
to the Supreme Court, will it be the issue, or will there be other
claimants who have a slightly different approach that the Supreme
Court will not reach? And will a bank ever be able to know when it is
safe to send its money overseas?
Tone Grant: There is an additional issue. If a U.S. claimant loses
before the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral tribunal makes an award
which does not satisfy the claim, does the U.S. claimant have any
further redress in the U.S. courts? President Reagan's Executive Order, by merely suspending pending litigation conceivably has not
precluded that claimant from obtaining redress in the U.S. courts. If
such a claimant were then able to obtain a judgment in the U.S.
courts, do the Agreements contemplate that the judgment creditor
could execute on that judgment by attaching Iranian property in the
United States?
Mark Feldman: If there is a cause of action over which the court
has jurisdiction under the Immunities Act, the claimant can get a
judgment and then can execute to the extent that there are Iranian
assets within the court's jurisdiction. That would take some time, I
suppose, but in due course he will probably be able to execute the
judgment.
Alan Swan: He can seek enforcement in the courts of some other
country.
Hans Smit: Tone says that the banks are just not going to transfer
those funds into the escrow account until these questions have been
resolved. Is that correct?
Tone Grant: Better to go to jail. Or, stated more carefully, it
may not be prudent for U.S. banks to transfer the Iranian assets frozen
in their U.S. branches until the issues concerning attachment are
resolved. Since Mark Feldman has previously suggested that any bank
which does not transfer the assets may be prosecuted, however, I seek
temporary reprieve until the issues are resolved! [Laughter]
Mark Feldman: We'll make an exception in your case, Tone!
[Laughter]
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Alan Swan: In fact your reprieve is already in the regulations.
They say that there is no danger of jail until there is a "definitive legal
ruling; 1 7 8 whatever that means.
Stefan Riesenfeld: I would like to emphasize again the article III
point. I am not talking about the security fund; I want to make that
very clear. I am talking about the article III point, and would like to
take it through a few steps. How will the Supreme Court, if the issue
ever comes to it, perceive the controversy? Congress certainly could,
although I do not think it will, repudiate the Agreements. It could
enact a statute or a joint resolution and say, "We will not permit the
implementation of this agreement." But, in fact, Congress has washed
its hands of the matter. It does not want to have anything to do with
it. Will the Supreme Court now perceive this as a matter in which the
Executive and Congress are in conflict and not as a conflict between
the Executive and the Judiciary and will it then rule as it did in
Goldwater 70 that the issue is not really for the Judiciary to decide?
Will it say, "This is a conflict between the other two branches of
government and we should not interfere?" Or will the Supreme Court
see it as a conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary itself and
say, "we must speak as we did in the salary case?"' 8 0 To me this is
quite material. It is also the answer to Hans' and to Covey's question
regarding the impact of the case on our democracy. The Supreme
Court may say: "We have a democratic institution - Congress. Congress did not do anything, so why should we do anything?" Is it
democratic for the Supreme Court to jump in when Congress washes
its hands? That to me is the first important problem: Will the Supreme Court consider it as a conflict between the Judiciary and the
Executive or as a conflict between the Executive and Congress?
The next question the court will have to consider is whether the
President's actions were justified under the circumstance. Here Cynthia Lichtenstein talked about normal commercial relations, as did
Charlie Brower. Let us look, however, at this "normal commercial
relationship." It involved agreements between the Shah's government
and private citizens in the United States. That was certainly a "normal commercial relationship." Then, a new government comes to
power in Iran and rejects some of the contracts. A lot of litigation took
place before the hostages were taken. Much of the litigation involved
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the question of whether the claimants could attach Iranian property.
The question was whether attachment was the proper remedy or
whether the law of retention could be invoked by the contractors
under conflicts principles, since local law controlled and Iranian law
was based on Swiss law, which has the so-called "right of commercial
retention." Some contractors had delivered prefabricated goods to
warehouses. Some contractors then said, "We will exercise our right of
retention and not send the goods to Iran although Iran has paid for
them, either because Iran has not paid in full or because we have
other damages." Then the hostages were taken. Does that mean that
the limit had been reached; that the commercial relationship was no
longer normal, and that, therefore, private claims became internationalized? Or is it the reverse? Are international claims temporarily
privatized because we have some domestic judicial remedies? On the
basis of past experience we seem to have reached a stage where the
Executive is legitimately under the Constitution, authorized to try to
work us out of the mess.
All these questions are valid issues. Yet, if we look at them all at
the same moment we create confusion. Could Congress, for instance,
decide to repudiate the Agreements, pass an internal law, and override a Presidential veto? Whether that is constitutionally possible may
be a key to solving all other problems. I wish somebody would say
something on that point. What do you think, Mark?
Mark Feldman: Everything in my instinct rebels against Congressional interference in the claims settlement process, as happened
in the Czech claims matter, but that certainly is a precedent.
Stefan Riesenfeld: I think Congress, wisely, would not do it; but
you would have to live by it, wouldn't you? I think it is an important
issue to see how the Court would perceive the matter if they tried to
face it.
Mark Feldman: Why is it important? Why is this an issue? Do
you think we have to argue this issue before the Court?
Stefan Riesenfeld: I do not think you have to, but the Court may
ask you the question. You cannot predict what they will ask you. They
may say that this is a controversy between you and Congress; that is
like the Goldwater case. It came as a bit of surprise, as you know,
then the Court said that the Goldwater case was really a conflict
between two branches of government and that, therefore, it was not
ripe. Others said it was a political question.
Alan Swan: The conflict in Goldwater was over the scope of the
President's power. I do not think that the question would be quite the
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same if it were posed in terms of a conflict between a later enactment
of Congress and a prior executive agreement.
Stefan Riesenfeld: No, no. I mean the question as it stands now.
Congress has done nothing, although the President sent a message.
The question is, "What type of conflict is it? Is it on the political level?
And if so, what is the political question?" In its present posture, you
could conceive of Congress passing a statute or a joint resolution. It
has not done so. Now, in that framework, "How will the judges look
at it?" That was Mr. Gordon's question, was it not?
Edward Gordon: May I just add to that? Alan, you said that the
issue in the Goldwater case was the President's power versus that of
Congress. The issue in the Goldwater case seems to have depended
upon who was deciding what the issue was. From the perspective of
the Court, at least to some of the justices and some of the commentators, the issue was simply what role the Court should play, not what
the underlying dispute was.
Alan Swan: I understand, but the framing of the issue concerning
the position of the Court was in terms of the underlying dispute. The
Court would clearly have perceived its role differently if the underlying dispute had been different.
Stefan Riesenfeld: Well, there was still a remedy in the Senate.
Robert Mundheim: It is very hard to know how to jump into this
diverse discussion. I guess, in part, the problem is one of determining
what kinds of restraints were appropriate on Executive power. Steve,
I think you are right. Congress is not going to pass the kind of
resolution that you have talked about. That is important because it
indicates basically a Congressional acquiescence in what the Administration has done. If Congress did act, I do not know what the legal
consequences would be. But if you had that kind of unhappiness with
the Executive's actions it seems to me that there then would be substantial practical consequences. It also seems to me that the worst
solution, in terms of restraining the Presidential power, is to say that
individual contract claimants could, in effect, upset the President's
attempted resolution of a number of major problems with a foreign
power. That seems to me to go to your article III and due process
question. I think Covey Oliver struck the right note in saying that we
have to be careful that we do not posture this case in a way which
would invite a court to say that individual contract claimants have
that right.
Another form of restraint on the Presidential power is that of
making the Government pay to the extent that it uses individual
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property or other rights to effectuate its foreign policy purposes. That
is a point that we have not yet talked about. I hope we will.
A third kind of restraint on the Presidential power is the very
substantial although informal political constraints which exist with
respect to the exercise of executive power. What I am referring to is a
general constraint on the President doing anything more objectionable
than is necessary to accomplish an acceptable purpose. That seems to
be the point about which Hans Smit has worried consistently throughout the day. I want to say a word or two about that. He has said that
the only people with whom the Government consulted during the
settlement process were those representing the banks. That was an
example, he suggested, of executive power run riot. But that is not
true. There were, from the very earliest times, consultations with the
broadest spectrum of claimants. The way that the letter of credit
problem is being handled reflects extensive discussions early in the
process with people who had that kind of problem. Mark Feldman,
Rich Davis,"'8 Bob Owen 8 2 and I met with innumerable contractors,
oil companies, and other people with claims. We asked for their
suggestions in the event we were able to move toward a settlement.
Let me give you another example of restraint. When the Government froze bank accounts, we could have frozen accounts on as broad
a basis as possible. We did not do that. For example, we specifically
licensed foreign currency accounts in U.S. bank branches abroad.
This was done for a very practical reason: so that we would not get
into more trouble than we had to with our foreign friends. For the
same reason, "cover accounts" were specifically licensed. So the notion that the Executive can act without any substantial constraints just
is not so. I think all of the actors in these proceedings, and the
President especially, were worried about how history would treat
them. That was also a substantial constraint.
Alan Swan: Could I interject a point here? There is a continuous
theme that comes up any time we discuss the question of the President's role in foreign policy. There are an enormous number of practical constraints operating on him, but one of the things that I puzzle
about is how much Presidential restraint is actually dependent upon a
realization that down the road there is Presidential accountability
either in the courts or before Congress; an accountability that is much
more than either history or the exigencies of foreign policy can offer.
181. Richard J. Davis, Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations), Department of the Treasury.
182. Robert B. Owen, Legal Adviser, Department of State.
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While it is important to understand that an impotent President, a
President who cannot handle problems, is as bad as a President run
riot, we have to be very careful about the dynamics that assure us a
restrained President. Law is the critical factor in those dynamics; the
threat of having to answer before the courts, the threat of Congressional repudiation, the threat of Congressional oversight. These kinds of
things are critical to assuring a structure of Presidential responsibility.
Much of the discussion here, therefore, is in terms of at what point
and under what rubric it is appropriate for the courts to step in to
assure that that structure is in place.
Michael Silverman: Actually, I would like to amplify a bit on
Bob's point concerning restraint. The issue that almost passed me by
now links up to this very well. I am concerned with due process. That
seems to me to be related to the adequacy of the remedy that is
involved in this case. I would say that two aspects of the Agreements
should be stressed. First, that the Government has acted with great
restraint in merely asking for suspension of the pending cases when the
language of the Algerian Declaration calls for termination." 3 So,
when in these circumstances we use words like "deprivation" and
"denial," I, for one, do not use them as terms of art. It may be that we
go too far when we use those terms with reference to the claimants'
actual rights, with perhaps the exception of the EDS case. The second
thing I would note, which has not been noted and may be worth a
footnote, is the Government's position in its recently filed Statement
of Interest. 184 The Government has stressed the arbitrability of the
claims under the exclusion provision and has asked Iran to take a
position on that issue which, I understand, is upsetting Iran's lawyers
greatly since it could be thrown back in their faces before the arbitral
tribunal. So, again, the Government has gone out of its way to aid the
private claimants. All of this ties together to suggest that the Agreemnents may actually work. As Hans Smit was saying, you have to view
this matter not in the light of 200 years, but as a problem in diplomacy under the particular circumstances that actually obtained.
Alan Swan: Could I just ask a technical question in connection
with the new Executive Order?18 5 It suspends the claims that are
arguably submissible to the tribunal. It does not, as I see it, go so far
as to say that those claims will remain in suspension until the arbitral
award is paid in full.
183. Algerian Declaration, supra note 1, at para. 11.
184. Supra note 33.
185. Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981), supra note 89.
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Mark Feldman: Oh, yes. The Executive order so provides.
Alan Swan: Is the point of disposition the point of payment or the
grant of an award?
Mark Feldman: If the award is negative, the claim is discharged.
If it is positive-if an award is made-the claim is discharged only
upon payment in full.
Alan Swan: And you are squaring that with the Agreements?
Mark Feldman: We have undertaken in the Agreements to terminate litigation through the process of arbitration. If Iran does not
meet its commitments to pay these claims in full, then the claims
remain valid until discharge by payment. I imagine, that if you were
a claimant in that situation you would probably be using the award,
not the original claim, as the basis for trying to collect the balance.
Frank Maier: To add to Michael Silverman's footnote, there is
another way in which our Government has gone out of its way to help
protect American claimants. A substantial number of U.S. companies
have stand-by letters of credit written in a way that arguably permitted Iran arbitrarily to draw upon the credits. Iran, in fact, did so in a
number of cases. In some of these cases, U.S. banks were enjoined
from making payments, at least on a preliminary basis. Those disputes
may proceed in the courts under the 1981 Executive orders and the
regulations, and the funds held under the bank stand-by letters of
credit continue to be frozen.
Edward Gordon: I want to go back to Cynthia Lichtenstein's
comment this morning'86 and amplify it in this way. The problem of
government interference with private rights in pursuit of the entire
national interest is not new. It goes back at least to the 19th century.
What is new is not merely that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
changed, but that the level of interaction between national communities has reached such a peak, and is so constant a factor, that what
was once an occasional, intermittent government interference with
otherwise protected rights and liberties is now likely to be so frequent
an occurrence as to change the constitutional arrangement completely. Also, it seems plain that this level of interaction between
individuals in different nations, and between individuals and the
governments of other countries, is going to increase, not decrease.
What was once merely an occasional annoyance is now a constant
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factor that is difficult to square with the traditional framework of the
Constitution.
Tone Grant: Ed Gordon and Cynthia Lichtenstein have expressed some concern about the growing interference of the U.S.
Government in private commercial relationships. They seem to imply
that there is an adverse effect created when governments become
involved in the commercial transactions of private parties. I believe
that we must recognize that many of the private internatioal commercial transactions would not be possible unless governments were involved. Banks lending internationally to government-controlled entities rely upon the guarantees or the credit of such entities in making
these loans or extending letters of credit. Private contracting parties in
international commercial transactions rely upon banks for the issuance of letters of credit. A concern is being expressed about government interfering with private commercial parties' rights, but in many
transactions, the private commercial parties are relying upon the
credit of the government. Also I think that, as you go through the
Agreements, you will find them remarkably workable under a lot of
different circumstances. In fact, the Government may, in many instances, have provided potential claimants with a more viable remedy. I also want to go back to my underlying point on the private
attachments. As Mark noted yesterday, many of the attachments were
brought as a result of the freeze and its protection, not necessarily
because a claim has ripened.
Alan Swan: Are you reflecting the problems created by the defenses of sovereign immunity and act of state in making that assessment? Once the Government stepped in and blocked Iran's accounts,
apart from the defenses of sovereign immunity or act of state, I would
think that the remedy in the American courts was certainly as effective, if not more effective, than anything the arbitral tribunal might
do. The security of any award by the arbitral tribunal is dependent
ultimately upon the willingness of the Iranians to provide the funds.
Robert Mundheim: No, but I think the point is that absent the
freeze the funds would have gone.
Hans Smit: I would have wagered you anything that the courts
would have stayed that.
Robert Mundheim: No. The Iranians were going to pull the
funds out of the banks, so you would have had to chase them somewhere else. Now, how much were in time deposits as opposed to
checking accounts and how they would have orchestrated the withdrawal are questions. They could have moved the money out fairly
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rapidly and there would not have been anything for anybody to
attach.
Mark Feldman: That's government helping its own people.
Robert Mundheim: That is exactly Tone's point.
Tone Grant: In considering the issue of waiver of sovereign immunity, I believe it must be considered in connection with economic
circumstances as they exist today. In previous decades there may have
been a more clearly defined distinction between private commercial
activity and government-related commercial activity. In today's economic markets, both domestically and internationally, I believe that
distinction almost ceases to exist.
Cynthia Lichtenstein: I do not suggest that in working through
its settlement with Iran the Government was unaware of private
rights or disregarding private rights. I recognize that there was an
enormous concern with what were the bargaining chips to be used
here. I was trying to suggest, however, that, to the extent Government has supported international economic relationships (such as
Tone Grant's example of loans made by the banks to developing
countries underwritten by a kind of International Monetary Fund seal
of approval) that support reflects a determination that the ultimate
foreign relations interest of the United States is a world where everyone is economically healthy; that underdeveloped countries left to
increasing degradation are potential sources of world conflagration:
"The fire next time."
Not only developing nations but, in economic theory at least, all
members of the world ultimately benefit from the free flow of trade
and exchange needed to pay for trade. So the Government supports
the flow of private funds; that is fine. I am only suggesting that, to the
extent the Government sees its immediate short-term foreign relations
interest served by the utilization of private rights, such as in grain
blockages, and so on, it is by that utilization discouraging the very
expectations that it had previously raised. There is thus a balancing
here. We really have to think about it. Even when we are talking
constitutional power, or compensation for rights, we must think about
what kinds of expectations have been raised in private claimants as to
their ability to deal with foreign governmental entities.
Robert Mundheim: Is that a political problem or a constitutional
law problem? Take, for example, the embargo of grain sales to Russia.
Ultimately you had an enormous amount of political reaction to what
the Government did that will get resolved in a political context. The
next question is, when the Government does what it did in the grain
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embargo, does it have a legal obligation to provide compensation?
Now, it decided as a matter of political judgment to do something in
that area. We did not, however, do anything with respect to those
people who lost good contracts in connection with the blocked trade
transactions with Iran. Are we talking constitutional law or legal
obligation or are we talking about judgments that governments necessarily have to make in a political context?
Mark Feldman: The broad issues that have been presented today
are, I think, valid issues. I am not at all sure the courts will reach
them in this case. I would like to remind you that we're talking about
an issue that is going to be litigated on the basis of a particular set of
facts. There are any number of facts that are compelling in this
particular situation. There is first of all the fact that you had a serious
crisis in our international relations affecting the entire society, so I do
not think we are talking here about the normal course of commercial
relations. There is also the fact that this is not a waiver of claims
(setting aside for the moment the hostage claims). We are talking here
about a comprehensive settlement of claims with a commitment to, in
effect, litigate in a special tribunal, to pay all awards in full, and to
provide a substantial security, a lot of money. There is every expectation of substantial compensation even if people are skeptical about
complete compensation. There is also the fact that these attachments
were authorized by the Government on the basis of a revocable license. That is something people relied upon. They brought their
actions in order to establish priorities against various contingencies
that did not ensue.
Last, but not least, I am very uncomfortable with the suggestion
that the U.S. Government used the claims for its own purposes. The
U.S. Government used the assets of Iran for multiple purposes. It used
them for obtaining the release of the hostages and it used them for
obtaining a remedy for the claimants. As I look back on our history, I
cannot think of a situation in which there has been a rupture of
relations resulting in a lot of claims, where it has not been necessary to
deal on a collective basis with the claimants in order to put the
situation back together again. I think everybody expected, whether
they liked the idea or not, that the U.S. Government was going to be
in there one way or the other. The objections to this were in most
cases nothing more than an attempt to lay a basis for a constitutional
challenge later on. They knew we would be in there; we had been
talking to the claimants practically since the first day. The basic
question was what kind of settlement we should try to make. Should
we go for a lump-sum settlement or for arbitration? Some, I suppose,
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hoped that there would be a vesting, and maybe that is what it really
comes down to. The Government has taken a course of action looking
away from the vesting of Iranian assets. Only through vesting could
the claimants be compensated with greater certainty and in a more
generous manner than is likely under the process we decided to establish. However, the U.S. Government has not vested assets in a long
time, and I do not think it is likely to do so in the near future.
Oscar Schachter: Coming back to Hans Smit's question concerning the restraints upon the power of the President that should be
applied in this matter,
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am sympathetic to his wish. Yet it seems to

me that our whole discussion has demonstrated that it is really quite
impossible to lay down any abstract formula. I do not think Covey
Oliver's suggestion on the distinction between international claims
and domestic claims would be especially helpful as a general rule. Nor
has any other broad criterion emerged here. Does that mean that we
have to conclude that this is all a political matter, as Bob ha suggested, or is there a constitutional issue? I am not a constitutional law
expert, but it does seem to me that we can conclude that there is a
constitutional determination that might be made, not in terms of any
particular abstract formula, but rather utilizing the old reasonableness type of approach, taking account of various particular factors
and weighing the interests which the Court has by now repeatedly
addressed in similar contexts. In short, it does seem to me that we can
conclude that we are not talking here about an arbitrary exercise of
power. In other words, Mark's analysis is one that most of us can
accept as applied to this particular situation. The only thing that we
can contribute, if we do not try to formulate hard-and-fast rules, is a
further exploration of what sorts of interest are relevant. Points about
consultation-the procedural side- are relevant. There are a number
of factors here which we can throw into the pot as relevant factors in
weighing governmental interests. In a way the discussion has been
useful. It does suggest that there are elements of restraint in the
situation and that these are relevant to a constitutional determination
but we are not going to be able to legislate hard-and-fast rules in the
future.
Harold Maier: I suppose I am about to reiterate some of the
things that Oscar Schachter said. I do not think the issue is whether
we should lay down or attempt to identify hard-and-fast constitutional rules. At the same time, however, in each of these situations
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where the Government has a specific problem to solve, there is a
tendency to focus upon the validity or the utility of the particular
solution without focusing upon the longer term impact of accepting
that solution on the allocation of governmental power. The Legal
Adviser's Office regularly takes the position that, in the United States,
executive power exists because it has been exercised over time in a
particular way. Out of history one develops a customary constitutional practice that creates executive power. The point I am making is
that the distinction that Bob Mundheim drew is one that is potentially
dangerous, although I do not think he meant it to come out quite that
way. one of the reasons we have constitutional controls on what
government does, and one of the reasons for the separation of powers
doctrine, is to insulate the populace from the effect of governmental
decisions which are made in response to perceived short term needs
without at the same time bringing into the equation the longer term
effects of those actions on the governmental structure. In that sense,
what Oscar was saying is absolutely accurate: One cannot constrain
the Government effectively by broad, hard, fast rules that might
make it difficult to conduct foreign policy in a manner that serves all
of us. On the other hand, one must always be aware of the assumed
principles of government action that are reflected in any given
decision-making process. To the extent that discussions of constitutional principles raise such issues, they are directly relevant to the
question of whether a particular agreement is one that ought to be
given effect and, if so, what its effectiveness should be in the courts, in
Congress, or in the executive branch.
Keith Rosenn: I would like to go to those constitutional issues
again. First of all, I want to answer Steve Riesenfeld's question.' 8 8 It
has been too long unanswered. It is clear that Congress could constitutionally pass a statute which says "We disavow the whole agreement."
What would happen is what happens whenever Congress passes a
subsequent statute inconsistent with a treaty. You may have international responsibility, but in terms of raw constitutional power, Congress has the power to pass such a statute. We have identified at least
three substantial constitutional issues. One is, of course, the taking
question. The second is whether the President, by himself, has the
power to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The
third is whether Congress has the power to deprive a class of litigants
from resort to all U.S. courts, federal or state, and whether that
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power can be jointly exercised by Congress and the President acting in
tandem.
There is no question that Congress has the power to make exceptions and to regulate the jurisdiction of the courts; article III is clear
on that. What is not clear is how far that power can be pushed in
particular situations. This is one area that has been left vague under
the decisions of the Supreme Court. Perhaps it ought to be left vague.
It is a delicate kind of issue that goes right to the heart of the political
system, and there is some felicity in the fact that historically it has not
been pushed to the testing point. If it is going to be pushed to the
testing point, if Congress is going to deliberately put its power on the
line and say, "Yes, we intend to take this away from the courts
altogether," I hope that it would do so in a context different from this
one. This context is very ambiguous. For example, had Congress
taken away the courts' powers by repealing the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to the extent that it waives sovereign immunity in this
particular case and also repealed that part of the 1955 Treaty that
waives sovereign immunity on Iran's part, few would deny the constitutionality of the statute.
There are other uncertainties. The procedural posture in which
the case is presented to the Supreme Court and the facts of any
particular case could well influence the Court's decision. If it comes
up in the context of something like the EDS case-which seems to pose
the constitutional issue most starkly-I think it would probably be
ducked by the Court. I would at least expect the Court to try very
hard to figure out a way of avoiding that kind of constitutional issue.
It is an extremely delicate one and, as Charlie Brower was pointing
out earlier, it is not all that clear how anybody is going to be hurt. It
may be that EDS is going to be hurt, but it is not clear that anybody
else is. It is a situation where prudential considerations of ripeness
might well come into play, and the Court may stay its hand for some
time to see how the dust clears. If you can wait for years and years,
relying on the distinction between the suspension and the actual termination of claims, it may all go away. I would not be at all surprised
to see the Supreme Court invoke the prudential aspects of ripeness to
say, "We simply will not interfere with this delicate situation at this
particular time," and I think that would be a very felicitous outcome.
It would be unfortunate if the Court sought to decide what I regard as
a very delicate and extremely difficult constitutional issue in a procedural context as complex as this one. It does not pose the constitutional issue with quite the starkness and clarity that the Court should
wait for.
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Stejan Riesenjeld: Then, prudentially, what weight would you
attach to Congressional inaction in the whole matter? That was the
point I really raised.
Keith Rosenn: I think it always very difficult to attach much
weight to Congressional inaction. The Court has gotten itself into
trouble when it tries to divine the sound of silence; Simon and Garfunkel are much better at that.
Covey Oliver: This is a point on which Felix Frankfurter had the
last word in the dissenting opinion in a famous estate and gift tax case,
when he said that we build on quicksand when we attempt to find in
Congressional inaction guiding legal principles.18 9 I think that takes
care of the inaction aspect. I came back to the discussion for a moment to say that I do not believe there is any thought here that we
should have some fixed or rigid set of rules. Our discussion was going
just the other way, so I am not quite sure what the thrust of the
remarks by my friend Oscar Schachter' 90 and others is. I want to
clarify that when I talked about international claims in the context of
international public law, I was only trying to narrow the problem. If
we can identify the "international claims" that are truly those that
individuals could not possibly sue on in a domestic court-those which
only their governments could espouse for them internationally-we
could remove a whole group of cases from any domestic concern at all
and relegate them to the arbitrators. All we have to do is hope that the
Court will stick with the 200 years of practice.
Now, as to the remaining cases, my general feeling is that the due
process taking compensation issue as applied to attachments falls on
Mr. Justice Holmes' side of the tolerated larceny of the police power
or, in this case, of the foreign affairs power. There is not much that
the Court will predictably do about the loss of the opportunities for
attachments and the like. But what we do want to avoid-and I do
not regard this as a rigid or black-letter rule, but a matter of public
policy linked to law-is getting ourselves in a posture of sanctioning a
naked power in the Executive to deny to private parties having a
dispute with a foreign government an access to the courts that they
would otherwise have as to substantive rights. The Executive simply

189. "Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and of Congress, but they would
only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle." Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940).
190. Supra at 222.
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cannot close the doors of courts for reasons of foreign policy preference. That is clear, certainly with respect to the federal courts, under
the separation of powers.
It is reasonably easy to avoid that confrontation. The first step
has already been taken. The suspension technique is a very positive
one in this regard. I for one applaud it, although under it we will not
get any black-letter rules out of the cases. Indeed, if there are potential Supreme Court clerks in this symposium, they might begin to get
ideas of how their justices should write the opinion in a great test case,
should one be taken up.
Tone Grant: In response to Keith Rosenn's concerns about
whether the various constitutional issues are ripe for decision by the
Supreme Court, I submit that the Court must make a determination
of the issues or the Agreements will never be fully implemented. I do
not believe that U.S. banks will transfer the assets until there is a final
resolution in the courts. As a result, the arbitral tribunal may never
function. I, too, am concerned about how the procedural aspects of
the Agreements will create a situation where the issues are ripe for
determination by the Court. I suggest that one means of creating a
taking in order to frame the issues for the Court may arise by ordering
the U.S banks to transfer the assets. Even if it is determined that the
prejudgment attachments of nonbank parties are invalid, the banks
themselves may have claims in connection with outstanding nonsyndicated loans. If the banks are not able to exercise their right of offset
against those deposits and must transfer the deposits, there may be a
taking. Further, in making the transfer, the banks may have liability
to those parties who have obtained prejudgment attachments against
those deposits. I believe the Court must make a determination of those
issues as soon as possible in order for the Agreements to be implemented.
Hans Smit: Since I see that the conference is drawing to a close
and we have really not covered what I regard as two very substantial
issues, I want to take the opportunity of asking Mark Feldman two
questions. The first relates to the waiver of the hostage claims. That is
clearly a case in which you took the claims and gave them away. The
question is the Government under a constitutional obligation to pay
compensation to the hostages for the claims that were taken from
them? Secondly, what is the significance of the provisions in the
Algerian Declaration relating to the assets of the late Shah and his
close relatives?'91 By those provisions the United States agrees, in
191. Algerian Declaration, supra note 1, at para. 12, provides:

12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the certification described in paragraph 3 above, the United States will freeze, and
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effect, to recognize the decrees nationalizing the assets of the late Shah
and his close relatives. I have spoken to some lawyers from Iran and
they said that this is right in point with the Pink case. 192 The United
States, by executive agreement, agrees to give extra-territorial effect
to a nationalizing degree of a foreign country. That means that the
courts in this country have no choice but to give those assets to the
power that has nationalized them. I do not think that the United
States intended to do that. It says, in the same provision, that the
United States waives the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity
on behalf of the State of Iran. Yet, Iran would never have to worry
about those doctrines if the assets already belonged to it. On the other
hand, if the intention is that Iran can go after the Shah and his close
relatives in an American court but will have to prove that those assets
were improperly taken from the original owners, I wonder why it was
necessary to recognize the extraterritorial effect of the nationalization
decrees.
Mark Feldman: There are three things I want to say. We have
not recognized the extraterritorial effect of any Iranian decree relating
to the Shah. As I have stated publicly and have told the Iranians, the
words "in accordance with U.S. law" mean that the law of the local
jurisdiction will apply. We will be prepared to tell the courts that.
Our understanding, for example, is that the public policy of the State
of New York does not give extraterritorial effect to such decrees.
Moreover, they do not have any such decree.
Hans Smit: No. but they were trying to get one fast enough but
could not manage it, right?
Mark Feldman: On hostage claims, we do not think that there
was any taking apart from the fact that we obtained for the hostages
their liberty. In our view, the courts of the United. States have no
jurisdiction over torts taking place outside of the United States.' 93
Therefore, nothing was taken from them. Of course, the subject of
compensation for them is under study. 91 4 1 think there is a disposition
prohibit any transfer of property and assets in the United States within the
control of the estate of the former Shah or any close relative of the former
Shah served as a defendant in U.S. litigation brought by Iran to recover
such property and assets as belonging to Iran. As to any such defendants,
including the estate of the former Shah, the freeze order will remain in
effect until such litigation is finally terminated. Violation of the freeze
order shall be subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S.
law.
192. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
193. Contra, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
194. Exec. Order No. 12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7931 (1981) establishes the President's
Commission on Hostage Compensation [for text, see injra Appendix at 78].
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that they should have compensation in line with the general trend of
compensation made available in the past for other persons similarly
situated; that is to say no bonanza. I am not sure that the hostages will
be very satisfied with that, but we have the POW's and others to
consider.
On Tone's point, what is going to happen to solve the bankers'
problem is that the attachments are going to be vacated by court
order. Then there will not be any excuse or concern for the banks.
There is also the provision in the IEEPA saying that no person can be
held liable for any action taken in furtherance of an order. But I think
the most important thing that I have learned from this seminar is that
we in the Government have got to persuade the Court that this is not a
question of depriving the judicial branch of jurisdiction. We have
never thought in those terms. We start from the point that there is a
substantive power in the President to settle international claims. We
could have settled them for twenty cents on the dollar or ninety cents
on the dollar and there could not have been a cause of action. What
we have is an agreement for the payment of these claims in full upon
certain determinations by an arbitral tribunal. In view of the history
and practice of arbitration up until World War II, we do not think
that raises a different point, so we do not look at this as a matter of the
jurisdiction of the courts; it is a question of the cause of action. I can
see we have some articulation to do on that.
The Commission shall study and analyze, and make recommendations to the President on the question whether the United States should
provide financial compensation to United States nationals who have been
held in captivity outside the United States, either (1) by or with the
approval of a foreign government, or (2) by reason of their status as
employees of the United States Government or as dependent of such
employees.

